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INTRODUCTION 
When a market for a stock is efficient, the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption requires courts to initially assume that investors who 
bought the stock relied on the integrity of the market price. This 
presumption is critical in establishing the common reliance necessary 
to certify a class when such investors assert a securities fraud claim 
under SEC Rule 10b-5. The validity of the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption rests on two related propositions. The first is descriptive: 
a company’s stock price in an efficient market will incorporate 
publicly released information about the company and its economic 
prospects; thus securities fraud will inflate the price investors pay for 
the stock. The second is normative: investors can reasonably rely on 
the integrity of public stock markets when purchasing stock. 
This Article primarily assesses the second proposition. Because 
stock prices are often inaccurate, critics commonly argue that markets 
do not have integrity. Rather than resting the reasonableness of 
investor reliance on what I will refer to as “market price integrity,” 
this Article argues that the integrity of public markets is best 
grounded in the regulatory structure governing which corporations 
can be publicly traded. Put another way, the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption is best justified not because of an expectation that stock 
market prices are precisely accurate, but on what I will call the 
“integrity of the public corporation.” Even if investors cannot 
reasonably believe that fraud in an efficient market is uncommon, 
securities laws increasingly seek to create public markets in which 
investors can reasonably expect that severe frauds will be rare. Such 
 
Copyright © James J. Park. 
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. 
PARK 11.6.2015 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2015  3:30 PM 
72 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 10:2 
reliance is clearly disrupted when fraud hides information indicating 
that a company should be delisted or is heading towards bankruptcy. 
I.  TWO THEORIES OF MARKET EFFICIENCY AND INTEGRITY 
In Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,1 the United States 
Supreme Court considered whether federal courts should continue to 
apply the fraud-on-the-market presumption to the typical securities 
fraud class action, which asserts claims under Rule 10b-5.2 In the 
briefs contending that the presumption should be eliminated, the 
essence of the argument was that investors simply cannot trust market 
prices because history has shown they are often inflated by noise and 
irrational expectations.3 Years earlier, the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. 
v. Levinson4 had rejected this argument, concluding that an investor 
can rely on the integrity of stock prices in an efficient market, and the 
Court in Halliburton affirmed Basic on this point while providing 
some additional analysis to support its conclusion.5 
This Part unpacks the concept of market price integrity discussed 
by the Court in both Basic and Levinson. In doing so, it argues that 
the descriptive and normative foundations of the efficient markets 
hypothesis are closely related. To the extent that markets can be 
described as accurate in valuing securities, the normative case for 
investor reliance on market prices is stronger. When resting on the 
weaker claim that markets react to information but do not necessarily 
value stocks correctly, the argument that market prices have integrity 
is not as persuasive. 
A.  Market Prices Reflect Fundamental Value 
The strongest case for market price integrity is based on the belief 
that stock markets are fundamentally efficient. Under this view, 
markets not only incorporate public information about the company’s 
stock price, they usually do so correctly.6 
 
 1.  134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 2.  17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 3.  See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 17, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (“Basic’s presumption of reliance cannot coexist with the reality 
that where one would expect maximum market efficiency and rationality, markets can prove 
extraordinarily inefficient and irrational.”). 
 4.  485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 5.  See Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2407 (2014). 
 6.  For a recent discussion of the hypothesis, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, 
Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 VA. L. 
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This bold descriptive claim about the functioning of an efficient 
market has implications for what investors can expect when investing 
in that market. If a market for a stock is fundamentally efficient, an 
investor can believe that the price of that stock largely reflects its 
value. If stock prices are accurate in this way, buying stock can easily 
be distinguished from gambling at a casino. Rather than simply 
making a bet, a stock investor has bought something of real worth. It 
should also be futile for traders to earn significant profits by searching 
for misvalued stocks because market prices will tend to be correct. 
Securities fraud disrupts these assumptions about a fundamentally 
efficient market. When a company commits fraud, investors will pay a 
price for the security that does not reflect its actual value and suffer 
losses when the truth is revealed. 
The Basic and Halliburton decisions do not directly refer to 
fundamental value when discussing market price integrity. It is the 
dissent in Basic that raises the issue, arguing that the majority’s view 
reflects the erroneous assumption that markets are fundamentally 
efficient.7 Pointing to the majority’s citation of a district court opinion 
asserting that investors can “rely on the price of a stock as reflection 
of its value,” the dissent argued that the majority “implicitly suggests 
that stocks have some ‘true value’ that is measurable by a standard 
other than their market price.”8 
Both the Basic and Halliburton dissents criticize the idea that 
markets are fundamentally efficient. They do so primarily by invoking 
the value investor, an investor who buys stock believing it is 
underpriced in that it trades at a price below its actual value. The 
value investor does not believe that the market price has integrity in 
the fundamental sense, but instead tries to exploit, for profit, 
inefficiencies in the market. 
The existence and success of value investors is a problem for the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption in two ways. First, the ability of 
such investors to earn abnormal returns undermines the descriptive 
point that stock markets are so efficient that such profits cannot be 
made. Second, the presence of value investors undermines the 
normative point that investors can reasonably believe that market 
prices reflect the value of their investment. 
 
REV. 313 (2013). 
 7.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 255. 
 8.  Id. 
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The Halliburton decision responds to these arguments on two 
grounds. The first is that “most” investors do not fit into the category 
of value investors.9 In the Court’s words, the majority of investors 
know “they have little hope of outperforming the market in the long 
run;” thus they “will rely on the security’s market price as an unbiased 
assessment of the security’s value in light of all public information.”10 
The second is that even value investors rely on the belief that market 
prices will eventually reflect fundamental value.11 
The first response does not convincingly show that value investors 
are unimportant. Even taking at face value the assertion that “most” 
investors are not value investors, it is difficult to deny that many 
investors take on a value approach. It may be the case that value 
investors are outnumbered by passive investors, but investors who 
assess whether or not market prices reflect fundamental value do 
more to set market prices than passive investors.12 Moreover, the 
question is not solely whether or not there are more value investors 
than passive investors; the mere existence of value investors should 
signal to passive investors that they cannot naively believe that 
market prices reflect the value of a stock. 
The second argument essentially contends that even if there are 
inefficiencies in the market price, investors rely on the belief that 
market prices are eventually correct. The Court notes that for a value 
investing strategy to succeed, the stock must return to its fundamental 
value. Such an investor will calculate the extent to which the stock has 
diverged from such value, “and such estimates can be skewed by a 
market price tainted by fraud.”13 
This is a stronger argument than the first, but it is somewhat 
unclear what the Court means. Typically, value investors look for 
stocks that are underpriced by the market. Yet fraud tends to inflate 
the price of a stock. Perhaps there will be cases where a value investor 
believes a stock trading at $10 a share is worth $15 a share, but it turns 
out that the company is committing a fraud and the stock is only 
 
 9.  Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 11–12. 
 10.  Id. at 12. 
 11.  Id. (“[A]n investor implicitly relies on the fact that a stock market’s price will 
eventually reflect material information. . . .”). 
 12.  For an argument that this price discovery is the “essential” role of the securities laws, 
see Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 
DUKE L.J. 711 (2006). 
 13.  Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 12. 
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worth $5 a share. The value investor suffers damages, so there is an 
argument that he should be able to recover the difference. On the 
other hand, given the value investor’s belief that market prices are 
often incorrect, it is difficult to base the case for protecting such an 
investor on the theory that market prices are fundamentally correct. 
B.  Market Prices Are Not Distorted by Fraud 
The weaker view of market price integrity would not require 
fundamental efficiency but only that market prices reflect public 
information. Even if stock prices do not accurately measure the true 
value of a stock, if a market is informationally efficient, stock prices 
will incorporate fraudulent statements. Put another way, if a fraud 
inflates earnings by 10 percent, that misstatement will also inflate the 
stock price trading in an efficient market by some amount. Even if the 
stock price does not accurately measure the fundamental value of the 
company, an investor has still paid more for the stock with the 
misrepresentation, and arguably should be able to recover damages. 
To say that markets have integrity does not mean that stock prices are 
usually right, but simply that investors should be able to rely on the 
assumption that the market price is not inflated by fraud. 
The Court in Basic relied in part on this absence-of-fraud form of 
market price integrity.14 The majority opinion noted that “the market 
price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly 
available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”15 
According to the Court, all investors rely on the absence of fraud 
because they would not invest in what was “a crooked crap game.”16 
Market price integrity as absence of fraud is easier to defend than 
market price integrity as fundamental value. Even if there is no 
knowable intrinsic value of a stock, because fraud causes a relative 
increase in what investors are paying, it is possible to conclude that 
investors would be paying less for a stock in the absence of fraud. 
Even a value investor, who relies on the belief that a stock is 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble With Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 897 (2013) (noting that the Court in Basic “constructed a complex 
theory of market integrity relying on the fact that, in an efficient market, fraudulent public 
statements distort stock prices”). For an argument that fraudulent distortion of the market price 
by itself should establish class-wide reliance, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking 
Basic, 69 BUS. LAW. 671 (2014). 
 15.  Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). 
 16.  Id. 
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undervalued, would pay even less for that undervalued stock in the 
absence of fraud. 
On the other hand, conceding that markets are not fundamentally 
efficient has its costs for the normative claim that market prices have 
integrity. If markets are unable to distinguish between fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent statements, investors should always expect a risk of 
fraud.17 Investors can respond to such risk by discounting the price 
they are willing to pay for a stock. Moreover, if markets cannot 
distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent statements, how 
can they distinguish between useful information and noise? If a fraud 
distorts a stock price by 5 percent but irrational expectations inflate 
the price by 100 percent, the risk of fraud is relatively trivial with 
respect to the overall volatility of a stock. If investors are willing to 
invest knowing the historical ups and downs of market cycles, they 
should be willing to invest even knowing that there is a modest risk of 
fraud. 
Perhaps the problem with the absence-of-fraud approach to 
market price integrity is that it does not differentiate between types of 
frauds. Even if investors should expect minor price distortions from 
fraud, the complete collapse of a company’s stock price in the wake of 
a fraud is not something that an investor should routinely expect. To 
fully appreciate the integrity of public markets, one must thus look 
beyond the accuracy of market prices to the regulatory framework 
that seeks to prevent substantial frauds. 
II.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: INTEGRITY OF THE PUBLIC 
CORPORATION 
Rather than resting its case for the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption on the accuracy of stock prices, this Article looks to the 
legal framework governing public companies. Stock exchange rules 
and federal law have long required companies to meet certain 
standards before trading on public markets. These regulations have 
become more stringent in requiring public companies to verify the 
accuracy of their disclosures. Especially in light of these increasing 
expectations, investors should be able to reasonably assume that a 
public corporation meets basic standards of integrity. 
 
 17.  See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 151, 160 (“Fraud and manipulation are predictable enough that it would be foolish 
for anyone simply to assume that a stock price has integrity.”). 
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A.  Securities Laws, the Public Corporation, and Efficient Markets 
The argument that stock markets cannot be trusted unfairly 
dismisses the significant effort by private and public actors over the 
years to construct norms and law to improve the integrity of public 
companies. Though these mechanisms are imperfect, they attempt to 
distinguish between those companies in which public investment is 
appropriate and those in which it is not. If a company wants its stock 
to trade on an efficient market, it must initially meet and continue to 
meet the standard for being a public company. 
Efficient markets do not exist without actors who facilitate the 
valuation of the assets trading in that market. Professors Gilson and 
Kraakman make this point in a famous article, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency.18 They note that while financial economists have 
spent much time assessing whether a particular market is efficient, 
they have not focused much effort on explaining which factors make a 
market efficient.19 Professors Gilson and Kraakman identify some of 
the institutions that facilitate market efficiency, such as research 
analysts, who process new information about a company.20 Moreover, 
they conclude that law is likely to play a role in that securities laws 
operate to reduce the costs of processing and verifying information.21 
More recently, financial economists have become interested in the 
role law plays in the development of trading markets. An extensive 
body of research on law and finance has posited that common law 
protections are associated with stronger securities markets, and 
presented evidence to support the hypothesis.22 There is no consensus 
as to the conclusiveness of these results, and the studies in measuring 
the effect of law do not delve much into the details of how securities 
law operates in facilitating the rise of markets. However, these 
findings suggest that law matters in developing well-functioning 
markets. 
There are two major mechanisms of interest by which law and 
private norms play a significant role in creating public markets that 
 
 18.  Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). 
 19.  Id. at 553 (“[D]espite the substantial progress that has been made, we still lack a single, 
comprehensive explanation for the existence of market efficiency.”). 
 20.  Id. at 571–72. 
 21.  Id. at 601. 
 22.  See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. 
FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2000); Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). 
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investors can trust. The first are the federal securities laws. The 
Securities Act of 193323 and Securities Exchange Act of 193424 set 
forth extensive requirements for companies that become public so 
that they can be traded on markets. To sell securities to the public, a 
company must have audited financial statements and file truthful 
disclosures with the SEC. As one court noted, investors rely on the 
“integrity of the regulatory process” and the “truth of any 
representations” in purchasing newly issued securities.25 This reliance 
continues as the company  files periodic reports with the SEC.26 To the 
extent that a public company fails to maintain these obligations, the 
SEC has the power to “revoke the registration of a security.”27 In its 
initial and continuing mandates, the federal securities laws define the 
line between public and private companies. 
The second is the private regulation set forth by stock exchanges. 
In particular, the exchanges have listing requirements that must be 
met before a company will trade on a market widely available to 
public investors.28 According to the New York Stock Exchange, 
meeting these standards “is internationally recognized as signifying 
that a publicly owned corporation has achieved maturity and front-
rank status in its industry.”29 As one court has noted, a stock exchange 
listing “carries with it implicit guarantees of trustworthiness.”30 There 
is an understanding that “a company must meet certain qualifications 
of financial stability, prestige, and fair disclosure, in order to be 
 
 23.  Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a to 77aa 
(West 2015)). 
 24.  Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a to 78pp 
(West 2015)). 
 25.  Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1977); but see 
Malack v. BDO Seidman LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 750 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the SEC cannot be 
expected to prevent fraud). 
 26.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West 2015). 
 27.  Id. at § 12(j), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l (West 2015). 
 28.  For example, the company must show an aggregate market value of $40 million for its 
publicly-held shares to list on the New York Stock Exchange. New York Stock Exchange Listed 
Company Manual § 102.01B [hereinafter NYSE Manual]. If the average market value of a 
company over thirty days is less than $15 million, the Exchange will proceed to delist the 
company. Id. at § 802.01B. The exchanges arguably have significant incentives to monitor its 
listed companies. See generally A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal To Replace 
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 963–81 (1999). 
 29.  NYSE Manual § 101.00; see also Samuel L. Rosenberry, Listing and Delisting Securities 
on the New York Stock Exchange, 45 VA. L. REV. 897, 898 (1959) (“[T]he Exchange has 
gradually developed listing standards which are designed to maintain a quality national and 
international market for securities of well established companies in which there is a broad public 
interest.”). 
 30.  Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1381 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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accepted for that listing, which is in turn so helpful to the sale of the 
company’s securities.”31 Thus, in setting forth listing requirements, 
exchanges make determinations as to which companies should trade 
in public markets. 
B.  The Rising Standard of Integrity for Public Companies 
For more than a decade, the distinction between public and 
private companies has been growing. There is now a much greater 
expectation that public companies provide accurate disclosures and 
have good corporate governance. Whether or not the cost of these 
measures is justified, these efforts are designed to improve the 
integrity of the public corporation. 
The first set of increasing requirements relates to the reliability of 
public company disclosures. The primary mechanism for this effort 
has been to mandate that public companies maintain a certain level of 
internal controls. These obligations were initially imposed through the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act32 after the discovery that many 
companies were secretly diverting assets to pay bribes in foreign 
countries. Such conduct was seen as affecting the integrity of the use 
of company assets. After the collapse of two major public companies, 
Enron and WorldCom, Congress moved to address “[d]efects in 
procedures for monitoring financial results and controls” that were 
“blamed for recent corporate failures.”33 Congress then passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires an assessment of the adequacy of 
a public company’s internal controls by both auditors and 
management.34 Commentators have noted that these provisions 
“produced the sharpest cleavage in terms of differentiating public 
companies.”35 
The second set of requirements relates to the governance of 
public corporations. The New York Stock Exchange has enhanced its 
listing rules with corporate governance requirements “aimed at 
maintaining appropriate standards of corporate responsibility, 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (West 2015). 
 33.  S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 23 (2002). 
 34.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West 2015). Sarbanes-
Oxley also makes efforts to ensure that auditors of public companies do not have conflicts of 
interest that would affect their integrity in auditing financial statements. 
 35.  Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 380 (2013). 
PARK 11.6.2015 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2015  3:30 PM 
80 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 10:2 
integrity and accountability to shareholders.”36 For example, 
exchanges now require listed companies to have boards with a 
majority of independent directors.37 After Sarbanes-Oxley38 and 
Dodd-Frank,39 important board committees such as the audit and 
executive compensation committees must consist entirely of 
independent directors.40 This move towards board independence seeks 
to ensure that corporate governance of public companies has integrity 
by removing conflicts of interest, some of which can facilitate fraud. 
Public companies have not only been distinguished through 
greater regulation, but also through efforts that seek to reduce 
regulatory costs for companies that are so established that the 
integrity of their valuations should not be in doubt. Under certain 
circumstances, companies that have already offered registered 
securities to the public may file registration statements that are not as 
extensive as unseasoned companies.41 This more lenient regulation 
reflects the belief that the valuation of corporations that have been 
public for some time is reliable enough to raise capital with fewer 
restrictions.42 
While all public companies must meet certain standards, it is 
important to acknowledge that investors cannot expect all such 
companies to be equally trustworthy. Large public companies have 
more resources than small public companies to ensure the reliability 
of their disclosures. Moreover, when a significant public corporation 
 
 36.  NYSE Manual § 301.00. 
 37.  Id. at § 303A.01. 
 38.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.A. (West 2015)). 
 39.  Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of U.S.C.A. (West 2015)). 
 40.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West 2015); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10A-3 (2015); see also Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 § 952, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-3; 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10C-1(b)(1) (2015). 
 41.  Such an issuer may  SEC Form S-3, which incorporates by reference the information in 
periodic filings. The most commonly used test for determining whether a market is efficient 
considers whether the issuer is a Form S-3 filer. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–
87 (D.N.J. 1989). Moreover, if a company meets certain size thresholds, it will be considered a 
Well-Known-Seasoned Issuer that can offer securities to the public with even fewer restrictions 
than seasoned issuers. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, 
Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 
44,722, 44,726–30 (Aug. 3, 2005). 
 42.  The timing of some of these reforms suggests that regulators are trying to offset the 
costs of Sarbanes-Oxley by loosening regulation of public companies in other areas. See James J. 
Park, Two Trends in the Regulation of the Public Corporation, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL 
BUS. L.J. 429 (2012). 
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fails in the wake of a fraud, there will be a greater social impact than 
when a small public corporation fails. Professors Langevoort and 
Thompson have thus argued that “[f]ull publicness treatment should 
be reserved for companies with a larger societal footprint.”43 At the 
same time, all public companies must meet basic regulatory mandates, 
and even though there will be questions as to whether the line 
between public and private corporations has been drawn correctly, 
investors should be able to reasonably expect that public companies 
will generally be safer investments than private companies. 
The distinctiveness of public companies goes beyond technical 
requirements of greater accuracy in disclosure and corporate 
governance. Professor Hillary Sale notes that after a period of scandal 
and failure to understand their obligations to the public, corporations 
increasingly operate in a climate of increasing government and public 
scrutiny with respect to their integrity as public companies.44 
Corporations that fail to meet social norms with respect to their 
conduct will face public backlash that can affect their business as well 
as their stock price. These demands for integrity require investment in 
compliance efforts by public companies, and the demand for such 
efforts is likely to grow. 
III.  INVESTOR RELIANCE AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION 
Shifting attention from market integrity to the integrity of the 
public corporation has a number of implications for the fraud-on-the-
market presumption. When a stock trades on a public market, it is not 
reasonable for investors to believe that its price is never distorted by 
fraud, but it is reasonable for investors to believe that its price is not 
severely distorted by fraud. This reliance is consistent with the 
increasing expectation that public corporations trading on a stock 
exchange meet basic levels of integrity. To the extent that securities 
class actions mainly police the integrity of the public corporation, 
courts should shape Rule 10b-5 doctrine to focus on the most 
significant frauds, such as hiding the fact that a company is heading 
towards bankruptcy. 
The normative case for the fraud-on-the-market presumption is 
best supported by the extensive role of the law in distinguishing 
 
 43.  Langevoort & Thompson, Publicness, supra note 35, at 342. 
 44.  Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 139 
(2011). 
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between public and private companies. When a market for a 
particular stock is efficient, it is the culmination of a long process 
where a company goes from a private company that is difficult to 
value, to a public company that outsiders are comfortable valuing. 
Such a company will be tested by gatekeepers such as private 
investors, underwriters, auditors, exchanges, and research analysts 
before emerging on the public markets. When an investor purchases a 
stock on the New York Stock Exchange, he justifiably has more 
confidence in the value of that security than if it were trading on the 
penny stock market. Though fulfilling the requirements of becoming a 
public company is no guarantee against fraud, these standards are 
meant to assure investors that the most severe frauds will be rare. The 
investor trusts markets not because market prices are always accurate 
but because law and norms help screen out companies that should not 
be publicly traded. 
Any company trading on a public market represents that it is 
meeting the requirements for being a public company in good faith. 
To the extent that there is a change in the company’s condition 
indicating that this implicit representation is no longer true, the 
company should disclose such a development to investors. Even if the 
company’s stock price does not precisely reflect its fundamental value, 
the fact that the company continues to trade implies that it continues 
to meet standards for remaining a public company. 
Investors purchasing a stock that trades on an efficient market 
should be able to rely on the representation that the company should 
be trading on a public market. This reliance can be violated by a 
company that commits significant fraud. A severe fraud can hide the 
fact that a company is heading towards bankruptcy or delisting. Many 
securities class actions have targeted such severe frauds. As one of my 
earlier papers shows, about 15 percent of the securities class actions 
filed from 1996–2004 involved companies that filed for bankruptcy.45 
In hiding significant information from the public, a company may 
continue to trade on an exchange when in fact it should be in 
 
 45.  James J. Park, Securities Class Actions and Bankrupt Companies, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 550 (2013). Securities frauds became more severe in the early part of the 2000s, as 
evidenced by the increasing percentage of cases where bondholders, who are typically shielded 
from securities fraud, recovered some part of a securities class action settlement. See James J. 
Park, Bondholders and Securities Class Actions, 99 MINN. L. REV. 585, 587 (2014). Nineteen of 
the thirty largest securities class action settlements of cases filed from 1996 to 2005 involved a 
bondholder recovery. 
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bankruptcy court or trading on the pink sheets. Investors who 
continue to purchase stock without knowledge of such fundamental 
developments can argue that their reliance on the integrity of the 
company as a public corporation has been disrupted.46 
It is important to acknowledge that expectations with respect to 
public companies have evolved significantly since the fraud-on-the-
market presumption was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1988, 
more than a decade before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. But even 
then, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act had been in place since the 
1970s, requiring internal controls and truthful books and records. 
Moreover, the fact that the severe frauds associated with Enron and 
WorldCom triggered the significant intervention of Sarbanes-Oxley is 
evidence that those frauds violated investor expectations with respect 
to the integrity of a public corporation. Finally, the Court in 
Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. affirmed the validity of the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption in the context of a post-Sarbanes-
Oxley world that requires more of public companies. 
Not all securities frauds would disrupt investor reliance on the 
integrity of the public corporation. It is unrealistic to believe that 
internal controls and listing requirements will stop all frauds, but they 
should prevent the most severe frauds absent extraordinary efforts to 
evade regulatory requirements. Shifting the normative focus of fraud-
on-the-market suits to protection of the integrity of the public 
corporation might support efforts to dismiss cases involving minor 
stock price fluctuations. If investors do not believe that stock prices 
are exactly accurate, the case for allowing recovery for a temporary 
decline in a company’s stock price is weaker. 
Because the reliance interest of investors is narrower under an 
integrity of the public corporation approach, an argument can be 
made that the doctrine governing securities class actions should also 
be narrowed to focus on the most significant frauds. For example, the 
test for determining whether a misstatement is material enough to 
support securities fraud liability could be refined in light of this 
Article’s analysis. If the reasonable investor relies on the integrity of 
the public corporation rather than the accuracy of a particular market 
 
 46.  Even when a stock does not trade in an efficient market, some courts have found that 
an investor’s reliance interest can be affected by significant violations of market integrity. When 
a company sells a security that is essentially unmarketable, investors can argue that they “relied 
on the integrity of the offerings” in purchasing the security. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469 
(5th Cir. 1981). 
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price, there will be a stronger case that a narrower range of 
misstatements will be material to that investor. To be material, a fraud 
must do more than affect stock prices—it must hide a fundamental 
change that would lead to questions about whether a company should 
be public.47 Such a materiality standard would reduce the costs of 
defending suits without merit by making it more likely that such cases 
will be dismissed at an early stage.48 
An objection to this approach is that smaller frauds can be 
significant as well. Larger frauds may often be the culmination of 
multiple decisions to manipulate disclosures in what seem to be minor 
ways. Even if private class actions are not as viable for such cases, the 
SEC could fill the gap. Such smaller frauds may be well-suited for a 
bureaucracy with the resources to pursue cases even when they may 
not be economically viable for private firms. 
CONCLUSION 
In affirming Basic Inc. v. Levinson’s assumption that investors rely 
on the integrity of efficient markets, the decision of the Court in 
Halliburton v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. rests on an uneasy foundation. 
It is difficult to argue that investors believe market prices are rarely 
distorted by fraud. Professor Langevoort has thus described the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption as one of juristic grace,49 and 
Halliburton does not provide a reason to change his conclusion. This 
Article seeks to provide a firmer normative foundation for the 
presumption of reliance that makes securities class actions under 
Rule 10b-5 possible. The reliance is not on market prices, but in the 
extensive law and norms that have defined the public corporation for 
many years. These efforts strive to eliminate severe frauds from public 
markets. Even if investors cannot rely on the integrity of market 
 
 47.  As I have argued elsewhere, materiality should be narrowed to focus on fraud that 
significantly distorts the fundamentals of the company. See James J. Park, Assessing the 
Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 513 (2009). 
 48.  Defendants may object that a stronger materiality standard is not of much help to 
them because it is difficult to win a materiality argument on a motion to dismiss. But it is 
unclear why public corporations could not make an effort to select cases that are weak on 
materiality to go to trial. In doing so, they would create more law on the issue, making it easier 
to dismiss cases in the future, as well as deter plaintiffs from bringing strike suits in the future. 
 49.  Langevoort, Basic at Twenty, supra note 17, at 195; see also Barbara Black, Behavioral 
Economics and Investor Protection: Reasonable Investors, Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. 
J. 1493, 1502 (2013) (“At its core, however, Basic is a pragmatic, not a theoretical opinion based 
on the purposes of the federal securities laws, including the protection of investors and the 
enhancement of investor confidence.”). 
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prices, they should be able to rely on the integrity of the public 
corporation. 
 
